ARTICLE: The War That (Thankfully) Never Was

Here’s a rabbit hole for you. It’s a look into the mindset of the British authorities prior to September 1939. What kind of war were they expecting? And how well prepared were they for it? The answer is horrific, and not remotely…

What did the British authorities think another war might look like?

The prospect of aerial attack dominated their thinking, but throughout the 1920s and most of the 1930s, planning for it was lackadaisical. It was not until 1938 that the authorities flew into a semi-panic as the possibility of war solidified and their preparations intensified accordingly. The problem had been that they had nothing on which to base their ideas. The First World War provided no realistic precedent. As terrifying as they had been at the time, ambling Zeppelins struggling to navigate and to aim their bombs were long forgotten. As catastrophic as it was to those who experienced it, the worst air raid, in which Gotha bombers attacked London in the summer of 1917 and killed more than 150 people, would now undoubtedly pale into insignificance thanks to advancements in military aviation. In the whole of 1914-1918, about 300 tons of bombs were dropped on the British Isles, killing just over 1,400 people. It would be worse, now, that much was certain. Much worse. But how on earth to predict quite how much?

In the years that followed the First World War, ratios were gradually scaled up as experts attempted to guess what Britain should expect if it all happened again. They arrived at a conclusion, which then shaped everything else, that in the very first hours, a brutal strike would be made from the air. They were convinced that the enemy would make an attempt at a ‘knock-out blow’ that would cripple Britain immediately. In 1924, an estimate provided to the Air Raid Precautions Committee guessed that London might anticipate 100 tons of bombs in the opening 24 hours of a war. By 1938, this outlook had darkened considerably:

‘London would be subjected to concentrated and intensive air attack by bombers operating from Germany. In the first twenty-four hours the Germans might attempt to drop as much as 3,500 tons. Subsequently, and for a period of weeks, the daily weight of attack might average 700 tons. A high degree of accuracy might be achieved by the enemy in bombing specific targets and areas. It was thought that the bulk of the raiding would be in daylight. It was thought that high explosive would be employed to a greater extent than incendiary bombs, while the use of gas was considered possible. The introduction by the enemy of bacteria directed against human life, animals and crops was believed to be unlikely but 'we must expect,' said the Government's Bacteriological Warfare Committee, 'a serious dislocation of our sanitary system and the resultant increase of disease’. The enemy was expected to launch attacks on the chief provincial centres of industry and on the ports (particularly on the east coast). The most vulnerable areas were considered to be those lying south-west, south and south-east of a line drawn from the Humber to the Bristol Channel… But overwhelming all else, during the period of active planning, was the problem of London. This concentration in 750 square miles of about 9,000,000 people, or one-fifth of the population of Britain, was expected to be the target of massed assault by the enemy's bombers.’