FREE ARTICLE: Weathering Caporetto Abroad, 1917
Despite how depressingly long it takes me to read anything in Italian, I have an obsession with collection paperbacks that belong to a post WW1 collection produced in Milan entitled Collezione Italian Di Diari, Memorie, Studi E Documenti per Servire Alla Storia Della Guerra Del Mondo, Diretia Da Angelo Gatti. Each is a difference perspective on the war, and today I’ve grabbed one off the shelf by Nicola Brancaccio, In Francia Durante La Guerra…
(Italian troops dig in along the Piave, 1917 (www.esercito.difesa.it)
Born in Naples in 1864, Brancaccio was an army man. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1883, where he served in the infantry, by 1906 he was stationed in Rome, in particular at the Army Historical Office. His special interest was in the history of the Piedmontese army, and various articles of his appeared in the journal Memorie storici militari. By 1910 he was a Major, then a full professor at the Turin War School. As per the title of his book Brancaccio spent almost the entire war in France as colonel-in-chief of the Italian Military Intelligence Service; seconded to the Inter-Allied Information Office in Paris. Remarkably autonomous compared to similar allied outfits, I’ll let him speak for himself about his unit:
When the war began in Italy in May 1915, a military mission was sent to France. It was initially very small and served as a liaison between our Supreme Command and the French Grand Headquarters. Later, in 1915, it was joined by an office dependent on the Ministry of Arms and Munitions, and then another sent by the Ministry of War.
In 1916, 1917, and 1918, its offices continually grew in number, and their respective dependencies multiplied, as other ministries and private associations entered into action. A Navy Mission was also formed, and needless to say, it acted on its own behalf and had very little contact with the Army Mission. In 1918, the Italian Military Delegation to the Council of Versailles overlapped with these organisations, so that at the end of the war, the Italian Mission established in France included a considerable number of offices and people who had successfully affirmed our traditional individualism.
…The Military Intelligence Service is, especially in war, notable because it is the one that, in its complex and varied activity, collects all the information that allows the commander to have a clear idea of the situation. In the particular case of the recent war, given the vastness of the front occupied by the Allied armies, it was necessary for the Intelligence Service to broaden its ordinary scope of action, so that the command of each individual Allied army also had precise information on matters of interest in the other theatres of war, so as to be able to better understand the overall situation.
It was therefore necessary to harmonise the actions of the Allied services and consolidate, to the extent possible, some overlapping tasks. Our Command therefore had a representative in France for two different forms of activity: one purely military, intelligence-based, and of exclusively Italian interest; the other liaison-based and of primarily inter-Allied interest. I will omit the first, which took place essentially in the war zone, and will limit myself to mentioning the liaison action…
The idea of an inter-Allied organisation of some services connected to the intelligence service was French, and originated in the "2nd Bureau" of the French Army General Staff, the office specifically responsible for intelligence… After reaching an agreement with the various Allied governments, a conference of representatives of the Entente intelligence services was held in Paris. At this conference, which took place around mid-September 1915, Colonel Rosolino Poggi, who was then head of the intelligence service of the Supreme Command, took part as the Italian representative.
All those present agreed that it was necessary to establish a central body to coordinate the action of the services of common interest, and thus it was decided to create a "Bureau Interalliés de l'Etat Major de l'Armée" with headquarters in Paris and which was to be an integral part of the "2nd bureau". To staff this office, each Allied army detached a Mission près du Ministère de la Guerre, each of which constituted a Section of the "Interallied Bureau."
This "Bureau" had no head; each Section functioned independently… This organisation was very flawed and should have paralysed the "Bureau." But it was then the beginning of the war, and the concept of common military interest was just emerging; the necessary trust between the individual Allies had not yet been established…
The Italian Section was formed from our Intelligence Service, which from that moment was divided in France into an Information Center that dealt with matters of Italian interest… I was in charge of the entire service in France… The number of enlisted personnel assigned to office services never exceeded six; and very important services were entrusted to ordinary soldiers, as it had been a constant principle of the Intelligence Service in France to limit personnel to a minimum and carefully select them, resisting self-interested intrusions. Thus, Private Vita Dattolo, Sergeant Locatelli, Sergeant Beldrotti, and Professor Colmano admirably provided, particularly the former, services that in other Allied Sections were entrusted to officers, even high-ranking ones. Praise be to all these excellent and modest collaborators.
The "Bureau Interalliés" was established in early October 1915 with a French section headed by Commander Hue, an English one headed by Colonel MacEwen, a Belgian one headed by Commander Michils, a very large Russian one headed by the military attaché Colonel Oznobichine, and the Italian Section. Serbian and Portuguese Sections were also supposed to be formed, but they never were. An American Section was added in 1918, and the Russian one was dissolved in 1917.
…Without going into unnecessary details, I will say that it was agreed to consider the following services of common interest: postal and telegram control; passport control, with the related creation of inter-Allied commissions in neutral states; control of the press and propaganda media; photographic control; economic blockade; regulation of advertising in newspapers; censorship of the press; navigation police; inter-Allied propaganda; exchange of draft dodgers and deserters; equivalence of military services; border surveillance; compilation and distribution of lists of suspects; unification of intelligence services in neutral states; and other minor matters. The documents relating to all these various forms of activity were to flow from the individual Sections into a single archive, available to all allies, held by the French Section and called the Archives communes. As can be seen, these were extremely complex forms of activity, which in fact gave rise to a whole host of special regulations.
Agreements between the various Sections of the Bureau on individual matters were far from easy. Most of them were overseen by their respective national command or department, and the principle of initiative did not motivate them all equally. The French Section was too closely linked to the Ministry of War to be able to make decisions on its own; it therefore always had to report to the Chief of the General Staff, who then reported to the Minister, who in turn had to deal—since almost all matters were of an international nature—with the Foreign Ministry, which was not unhappy with the systematic contradiction. The British section never made a single comment without repeated telephone conversations with its War Ministry, on which it depended. A characteristic of the British was to always return to the same question at every conference, from its starting point, as if it had never been discussed, and this with an admirable but unnerving obstinacy. The Russians never concluded anything, avoided every discussion, and if forced to respond, they deferred to the decision of distant Petersburg, slow to be informed and slow to respond. The Belgians were quick to make decisions; so were the Italians, who acted largely on their own initiative.
…Throughout this initial period, the Italian Section's situation was very difficult. Completely deprived of instructions, as it never received any, it had to act on its own initiative, without receiving precise answers to the questions it posed to the national authorities, and therefore without ever being able to express the official Italian opinion in conferences. To avoid revealing this weakness, it had to make decisions, and it was not yet certain what reception these initiatives would receive at home. Only later did it realise that the national authorities always accepted its decisions with confidence, even though some of them were indeed bold, given the modest personalities of the negotiators. Furthermore, the Section was regarded with considerable suspicion, not for personal reasons, but because everything Italian was distrusted, especially by the French. Section members were sometimes excluded from meetings reserved only for those at war with Germany, and an attempt was even made to remove one of our officers on the grounds that he was a Giolittian. Thus, there was a distinct sense of being marginalised by the other Allied representatives. This was a serious flaw, which compromised the Italian Section's relations with the French Ministry of War for the entire duration of the war.
During… 1916, the Service's activity had become extremely lively. Divided into several departments (military mission and discipline, military intelligence, counterespionage, economics, propaganda, press censorship, passports, draft dodgers, deserters, mail and couriers), it concentrated within itself most of what concerned Italian military and economic interests. Its jurisdiction extended throughout France, both through the various military offices scattered throughout the country and, more specifically, through the Royal Consulates, with whom the
Royal Embassy had granted it several powers.
The workload soon became disproportionate to the personnel's capacity; therefore, it became necessary to limit its activity. A relief came with the return to Paris of military attaché Colonel Breganze, who reclaimed all matters relating to the management of the military mission and the Italian offices in France, leaving only the Royal Consulates under the Service's control. Carabinieri of Modane, Nice, and Menton.
Furthermore, it was decided to move the economic department to Rome… However, this did not completely exonerate the Intelligence Service in France from its economic responsibilities and, in addition to being consulted on the matter, especially by the French offices on every important occasion, I remained as head of the service until 1918, Italian delegate to the Inter-Allied Committee for the Blockade and Blacklists functioning at the French Ministry of the Blockade, and member of the delegation to the Permanent International Committee for Economic Action.
However, the withdrawal of the economic department and several other incidents that occurred reinvigorated the distrust of Italian conduct within the Allied offices, and more particularly within the French offices of the "Deuxieme Bureau," which had never subsided, but had only been allayed by the persevering action of the Service personnel. Some unfortunate events occurred.
I no longer believed I could tolerate this behaviour, and in November 1916, on my own initiative, I withdrew the Bureau's office from the premises of the French War Ministry, moving it elsewhere to its own headquarters and almost completely severing relations with the "Etat Major de l'Armée." This decision of mine was neither approved nor disapproved by our Supreme Command, but it certainly did not facilitate the Section's work, which, in the following year, stagnated in its activity, limiting itself almost entirely to dealing with matters concerning the press.
The book is a diary of sorts, a collection of thoughts and opinions recorded at the time. I’ve decided to jump right into 1917, and see what the unfolding disaster at Caporetto looked like to an Italian officer abroad…
About a fortnight before the Italian army was hammered by the Central Powers and sent into a large-scale retreat, Brancaccio was reluctantly embroiled in petty squabbling with the French:
October 7.
Our Italian Institute in Paris had attempted to have articles and photographs published in French newspapers that mentioned the actions of our Italian contingent on the French front. However, the French censorship had always opposed any publication of any such news. After insistence, it was discovered that the ban came from the Grand Quartermaster General, who alleged that Italy was deliberately keeping quiet about the actions of the French batteries on the Italian front, and that consequently nothing should be said about the Italian troops until justice was done to the French troops.
Having taken charge of the matter, I contacted the senior officer in charge of press affairs in the cabinet of the Minister and received confirmation of the instructions given by the General Q.Q.G. The officer, however, was unable to explain these instructions because, under the Ministry's press service, an excerpt of what the Italian press had said about the French troops had been published, which had been communicated to the French press. The same superior officer also added that he had learned that the articles sent by Maurice Waleffe to the Journal, from our front, had been found too enthusiastic for us, and that Waleffe had been asked to moderate his enthusiasm.
He was also preoccupied with a new, incoming ally in the shape of the Americans:
October 8.
The Supreme Command instructed me to establish close liaison with the American services that are being organized in France. I went to Commander Mahan, the United States military attaché, to make arrangements with him. Commander Mahan declared that he had no other duties than those of the ordinary embassy service, and hastened to put me in touch with Lieutenant Simmoun, who is in charge of the intelligence service under the American General Headquarters.
Lieutenant Simmoun has been living in France for some time and is well acquainted with French life; having previously had dealings with him, it was easy for me to make arrangements and lay the foundations for fruitful relationships that may even go beyond the limits of simple military intelligence. Simmoun is, in fact, General Pershing's right-hand man, and a close friend of mine, Morton Fullerton, a well-known American journalist, is highly influential with the general as well as in American political circles in Paris and Washington.
American organisations function independently of any consideration of rank or category; it should therefore not be surprising that tasks of primary importance are entrusted to a lieutenant, assisted by a journalist, however influential. I therefore thought it appropriate to establish a connection—also for service purposes—with the two gentlemen, also in light of considerations resulting from a long conversation with both of them. And here is the summary of that conversation, as I heard it.
The United States entered the war with the firmest will to act with maximum energy, and contrary to what we believe, the popular union of wills was actually created by an idealistic principle and not by considerations of material interests. If it had been a matter of interests alone, agreement would always have been unattainable, because it was impossible to find a single common interest; the only driving force behind the Anglo-Saxon mysticism of the Americans was action for a lofty ideal.
Therefore, the landing in France was a disappointment for the Americans, since, behind the usual formal courtesies of the French, they immediately saw the most obvious economic mistrust emerge, often without restraint. They were also offended by the failure to recognise the reasons for their intervention, too insistently represented as their obligation of gratitude. Now, for a people so jealous of their independence, the mere suspicion that they might have been forced to act constitutes an insult. The Americans were also hurt by the disregard to which, as soon as they had gone out of fashion, they were treated; as well as by the insistence with which the Chamber and the press assert their obligation to replace the French at the front and fight for France. In short, the Americans are already suffering from France's fickleness, which alienates much of their sympathy from France. Other underlying reasons prevent the Americans from relying too heavily on England, in which they have little confidence. Instead, they have great sympathy for Italy, whose energy they admire and whose idealism they believe to be superior to that of the other allies.
This makes possible an American orientation toward our country, an orientation that could manifest itself without delay, if we could enlighten Wilson, who is still poorly informed about our affairs. This could be achieved with the influence of the two people mentioned above, fervent supporters of an understanding and cooperation with Italy…
A month later, the Battle of Caporetto was in full swing, and it was going very badly for Italy:
November 7.
Without any pessimism or exaggeration, I can assert that in a few days Italy has lost in France all the prestige it had laboriously gained in three years of war.
True sympathy for the Italians has never existed here, and for two years I've noticed this and understood the reasons. The mentalities of the two Latin sisters differ markedly, and in this war they clashed in their main characteristics: one with its pride born of domination; the other with its ambition and subjugation. Little by little, however, Italy had imposed itself on the French mentality; not out of sympathy, but because of its virtues, its energy, and the sense of nascent strength it conveyed. In essence, it was feared more than loved, and the fear made it difficult to see whether it was truly respected, or whether, deep down, a suspicious contempt for the "traitor" persisted, whose betrayal was useful but little appreciated. And so Italian prestige crumbles, fear vanishes, and all the animosities and resentments resurface. Vae victis! Although French aid was prompt, it is beginning to be paid dearly.
The first unpleasant things we were told touched on the capabilities of the Italian Command. The Oeuvre begins with General Verraux, a former guest at our front, sent there to disarm his ongoing hostility, and who instead returned so irritated that he had never written another word about the Italian army. Now he has an easy time of it, and has begun by criticising the deployment on the upper Isonzo, which he calls not only defective but a harbinger of disaster, to the point of advocating modelling ourselves on the French army and general staff. The Journal des Débats, written by Gauvain, expanded on this concept, demonstrating that it was absolutely essential to prevent the French troops sent to Italy from being placed under Italian command. And this thesis was further developed by L'Eclair and L'Information, which explicitly expressed their complete distrust of the Italian high command, suggesting their replacement with French cadres. And here I had to involve censorship.
Certainly, echoes reaching us from our own country and from Italians, with our usual system of exposing everything to the sun, could have given rise to facile assertions, but more than anything, they favoured the second set of accusations, which concerned the weakness of our soldiers. All the evidence presented in two years of continuous offensives was forgotten, and only the fact of brigades that, faced with enemy attack, were alleged to have surrendered to the chant of the Internationale remained present in mind. And the idea was conceived that the Italian army, trained by Leninists, was taking the lead of the Russian army. This idea can be said to be dominant, permeating every conversation and every newspaper article, and resulting from a special kind of resentment.
Italy's attitude toward Germany has always been a source of mistrust and animosity here.
Perhaps we have not sufficiently taken this aspect of the French psyche into account; Hatred of the Germans, the feeling that between Germany and France it was a matter of life and death, and that therefore it was impossible to do anything but take sides for one or the other. How many stings we received because of the delay in declaring war on Germany!
We all remember it, especially those of us on mission in France. How much distrust we felt because Germany did not send troops to our front, and because of certain special diplomatic conventions! And those German ships interned in our ports, which everyone still throws in our faces today, saying we will finally decide to requisition them. And then all those enemy subjects who—to everyone's amazement—are said to roam our country with impunity!
This attitude of ours has never been forgiven, and the conquest of the Bainsizza plateau was necessary to silence the comments. But not to clear up the fog: so much so that, a few days ago, the chief of the French command's intelligence service in Italy said here that he would request full police power in the French-occupied Italian zone, because we were letting the "boches" circulate and he didn't feel safe.
And we can finally vent our resentments over "our war," over our policy of saving manpower, and finally and above all over our so-called imperialism, a constant source of French concern. And the Yugoslav revenge, and the Debates, never fail to warn us that if we had thought a little less about ourselves and a little more about our allies, we wouldn't be in the current plight. Nor is the sentiment of Le Temps different, writing that it's very convenient to call for a united front for those who have always economised on sacrifices, and reminding us that heaven helps those who help themselves.
Our reserves of men have always been a nightmare for France. Upon the first publication of our prisoner figures in the Austrian bulletin, the Libre Parole immediately wrote that it was hoped we would decide to call up the classes over 42 years of age. A true cry from the heart! The French who went to Italy returned outraged by the sight of so many of our officers and soldiers loitering through the streets of the large cities. And here they are right. In those accustomed to the spectacle of large French cities, empty of every valid element, such resentment is understandable.
But it is superfluous to continue; it is superfluous to cite the popular and even upper-class phrases, which express the idea that France is the one saving allies; the phrases of departing soldiers, who claim to be going to reorganise the Italian army. It is this simple and tolerable "brag" that only demonstrates how proud and patriotic this people is, despite their suffering. And praise be to them for it. What is painful, however, is that general feeling toward us, which is not one of natural pity, and is all the more sensitive that even the press, our most friendly, is silent, unable to say anything.
It is a difficult time passing, reminiscent of the one preceding our declaration of war on Germany. I must note this, but I must not hold it against this proud, sensitive, fickle people. And it is also our fault. We have not sufficiently cared for their psychology, we have not been able to win them over, and perhaps we too have been too hasty and too unfoundedly proud, as well as too absorbed in self-contemplation.
The extent of the Italian retreat during the Battle of Caporetto (West Point)
November 10
On his return from his trip to Italy, I spoke at length with Mr. S..... His impressions are very pessimistic and are supported by the opinions of some of our journalists. He, while noting the patriotic reaction of our country, does not believe that the current feelings will last, because in his opinion Italy does not have any well-developed common feeling - such as French patriotism, for example - on which a government can count.
The current outburst will disappear and nothing will remain. It would therefore be necessary, the S..... always says, for our government to undertake a propaganda campaign within the country to create a common sentiment, which could be hatred of the Germans. I note, however, that this hatred of the Germans is a common refrain among the French, who would like the current opportunity to completely separate us from the Germans. The S..... also has little confidence in the Italian army, because events have shown it to be "tout de façade.”
He has so little confidence that he raises the question of whether it is still wise to count on Italy or whether, in the French interest, it would be wise to abandon it entirely to its fate and blockade the Anglo-French forces on French territory. His opinion, in any case, is that too many soldiers should not be diverted to help Italy, and indeed it would be appropriate to repatriate those currently in service as soon as possible. He told me stories of the soldiers of the expeditionary force's anger against the Italians (commonly called "boches"), and also expressed his opinion that any propaganda we do abroad is inappropriate today, because no speech will be worth the facts and we are completely disempowered. It is better to intensify propaganda at home; if we succeed in strengthening the people and the army and getting them to achieve strong goals, the effect of propaganda at home will be indirectly felt abroad. The judgment is pessimistic, but the S... is "magna pars" in the M..., whose Italophilia is subordinated to the benefit Italy can provide in supporting French policy.
By the third week of November, the battle was winding down; the Italian Army finally settling into a new line after a staggering rout that is still lamented in Italy:
November 17.
I am once again encountering difficulties in my relations with the Allied Services. Our recent military misfortunes and the causes attributed to them—namely, the weakness of our authorities with respect to enemy propaganda and espionage—have caused us to lose all solid moral prestige. The suspicion that we, deliberately, do not want to act with all our strength against every enemy demonstration, and the suspicion that we want to continue using combination methods, has become so deeply rooted that it often manifests itself in actions that are not only disrespectful, but also decidedly distrustful.
I have already noted clear symptoms of this distrust here, on the occasion of the departure for Italy of the head of the Counter-Espionage Service at the French Expeditionary Force headquarters. This was repeated, even more explicitly, when the corresponding British counterintelligence service was deployed… This belief, further supported by the fact that we have not provided any relevant material from Italy, has resulted in us no longer being communicated with: "because there is nothing left.”
The personal influence of myself and my officers, whom I have known here for two years now, still allows us to achieve—despite everything—some results. But continued self-sacrifice is required, as we must face the daily humiliation that cannot be left untreated. It is not, however, to lament that I write about this situation; on the contrary, the more painful the combat position, the more deeply rooted we must be. Rather, I would like our authorities to understand that clear, energetic, and decisive conduct in all matters we must address is now imperative, and that it is no longer possible, without losing all confidence in us, to continue with half-measures. A new direction has emerged among our allies, one that demands energy; we cannot, without risk, fall behind.
Through my direct efforts and the work of agents under my command, a survey has been conducted regarding the public's opinion of Italians subject to military service and currently residing in France. The Ministry of the Interior has been explicit; It is strongly desired that they be repatriated, and to my observation that we had not received much assistance from the French authorities in this regard, I was told that times had changed, and that, especially for reasons of public order, they wished to evict the excessive mass of our deserters…
In the event of foreseeable failure, they would be outraged against the shady elements that Italy is allowing to escape… At the Paris police stations, there is no concern about possible disturbances caused by the presence of Italians. A few "échaffourrées" perhaps, but nothing more. It was not hidden from me, however, that following the recent unfortunate events, antipathy toward Italy had reawakened and that the presence of Italians was considered undesirable, given that it was their duty to defend their homeland themselves, rather than allow it to be defended by others.
Finally, among the working classes, with greater or lesser violence depending on the neighbourhood, animosity against Italians is widespread. This animosity has always existed due to professional rivalries, but it had intensified during the war, especially among the women of the workers, due to the immigration of our workers and the widespread granting of exemptions to Italian conscripts, although desired by the French government. The departure of French troops for Italy was all the more fuelling this animosity, as the Painlevé ministry had hinted at a large recall of men, from the front to the interior, as well as widespread granting of leave for the men who would remain on the front lines.
Now, everything having gone up in smoke, there is great irritation, both among the troops and within families. The term "cochons d'Italiens" is widely used, and, an eloquent symptom, our militarised workers, who had insistently demanded the tricolour armband, have now all removed it. It is appropriate to provide for the fastest possible evacuation of our compatriots who are subject to military service.
In the wake of Caporetto, the Allies deployed thousands of men to Italy to bolster Brancaccio’s countrymen. Understandably this had a lasting effect on how he operated in Paris. He moved back in with the 2nd Bureau:
In November 1917, following a marked change in French attitudes towards Italy and subsequent repeated friendly gestures by the "Etat Major de l'Armée," the Intelligence Service re-established close relations with the French intelligence services, and the Section returned to the building used as the "2nd Bureau" of the said General Staff. Its activity immediately resumed intensely, also extending to the judicial field; new relations were established with the Undersecretary of Military Justice and with the major national security management bodies.
The Service's influence at that time became remarkable, and it can be clearly stated that, both in the aforementioned French offices and in the inter-Allied organisations where matters of interest to the Service were discussed, its opinion generally predominated. Not only had all mistrust vanished, but it had been replaced by an unquestioned sense of general esteem for Italian character and ability.
The armistice of November 11, 1918, marked the end of the Intelligence Service's main activities. In the early months of 1919, the "Interallied Bureau" was dissolved, and consequently the Italian Section as well. Public life gradually returned to normal, and the exceptional measures for national protection were abolished. Thus, the various dependent services ceased; only during the Peace Conference did the gathering of information regarding the complex activities that took place alongside the Conference continue; finally, the Intelligence Service in France ended its laborious and selfless existence on October 15, 1919
It was never easy to have Italy as an ally.