FULL FEATURE: How the French fought in Italy in 1944

The story of the French in Italy in 1943-44 is pivotal in their history, not only because it marked such a seismic reversal for Hitler caused by the Allies, but ‘for France, it was a testament to the vitality of an army that was believed to be dead.’ So wrote General de Monsabert in 1946. And yet does an anglophone audience even remember that they were there? And just what incarnation of the French was this? Surely they signed an armistice in 1940? Why would Pétain and his Vichy regime have participated in this campaign? Because this before D-Day, before the liberation. So surely this was De Gaulle and his Free French? Well, yes, but also no.

Today, I thought I would spend some time attempting to untangle this typically French mayhem, and explaining just what the Corps Expéditionnaire Français was, what it represented, who fought in it, and why, and how it came to be in Italy flying a French flag come 1943; the first unit to do so in Europe since the humiliation of 1940…

Firstly. How did anyone end up in Italy at all?

It started with Operation Torch, in November 1942, and the long term, inter-Allied plan to defeat Hitler. But first, we need to go back a bit further.

The Soviet Union spent half of 1941 trying to fend off Operation Barbarossa, and were applying intense pressure on Britain and America to open up another front in Europe and ease the strain on them. The concept was not ridiculous to London or Washington. America was keen to see it happen, but don’t forget they’re not actually in the war yet, officially. That won’t happen until December. Therefore, despite the fact that they promised to support Britain in the fight against Germany at this stage, Churchill was understandably cautious. Of course, at some stage a massive offensive was going to have to be staged in Europe to get rid of the Nazis, but better to defer it as long as possible. Instead, the British Prime Minister advocated attrition; why not use the navy and the air force to grind the enemy down with huge bombing attacks and peripheral chipping away, as they slowly throttled the Third Reich out of existence?

Then Pearl Harbour happened, and despite Japan running amok around the Pacific, at the Arcadia conference that ran over Christmas 1941 and the New Year, the US Government settled on a ‘Germany First’ policy in the hope that Hitler rolling over would cause Tokyo to capitulate rather than fight on alone. Politics was in play too; it was a move to reassure both Britain and the Soviets.

There then followed a massive amount of wrangling about where a large assault on Europe would take place, and honestly, nobody was really thinking about French participation at this stage. America had a massive amount of work to do to get on a proper war footing. Mobilisation would not be truly rocking until 1943, nor the kind of industrial production needed to keep nearly ten million Americans fighting a war. Initial planning suggested a 48 division landing in Northwest France in the spring of 1943, (named Operation Roundup at this point) and/or a smaller effort at the end of 1942 if the Russians looked like they were about to collapse, or if it looked like the Germans were faltering. The running joke with the Russian input at this stage was that the Soviet Foreign Minister spoke exactly four words of English: ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ and ‘second front.’ Stalin went as far as dangling the threat of agreeing to a separate peace if his Allies did not play ball, and other options were explored. Operation Sledgehammer was one; it would have seen landings in Brittany in autumn 1942, but Churchill had already started talking about the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe, and North Africa.

The arguments ‘for’ included kicking Italy out of the war, controlling the Mediterranean, and securing the Suez Canal. The Americans were not massively keen, it seemed a long way away from the goal of beating Germany. ‘The decision to invade North Africa required a complete reversal of our ideas and a serious revision of our plans,’ Eisenhower wrote after the war, but Churchill, if anyone, could talk a good game, and in the end, the need to get something done in 1942 prevailed.

So now the Allies were committed to going first across North Africa, then, after the Casablanca conference, to ploughing away at the Mediterranean in 1943. Again, the American contingent was reluctant, preferring to get on with Operation Roundup, but though this was still in preparation, the British successfully argued that to beat the Germans in France, they’d need to be weakened first. Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, was now on the table.

By May 1943, with Tunisia taken care of now too, at The Trident Conference discussions were held on what was supposed to happen after Husky. Churchill argued that Italy needed to be defeated, and that that would cause ‘a thrill of loneliness on the German people, which could constitute the beginning of the doom.’ Also, obviously, if Hitler was forced to stack forces high in Italy, it would impact what he could do everywhere else. Lastly, Churchill preached caution about the eventual invasion of Northwest Europe. When it happened, it needed to be done right, and so he argued that the best way to relieve pressure on Russia in 1943 was in the Mediterranean. The Americans were on board, but only if eyes remained on the bigger prize, now renamed and scheduled for mid-1944: Overlord.

Husky was a success. Mussolini fell from power in July 1943, and now the focus was on Operation Avalanche: the Allied landings on the Italian mainland. So where do the French come in?